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Really fucking brilliant
BART GEURTS
The title of this note has a two-tiered interpretation. On the ‘‘use’’ level, it
expresses my admiration for the ingenuity and elegance of Christopher
Potts’s paper, which is not diminished by the fact that I disagree with
him practically across the board. On the ‘‘mention’’ level, my title denotes
the key phrase in Potts’s example (2), which will ﬁgure rather prominently
in the following remarks.
It is evident that the information speakers convey by way of linguistic
and para-linguistic devices comes in various kinds, and widely agreed that
we have distinguish, at the very least, between Fregean content, presup-
position, and conversational implicature. If Potts is right, expressive con-
tent should be added to the standard triad, and in this, quite fundamen-
tal, respect I concur. I disagree with Potts on two main points. First, I
have my doubts about Potts’s pre-theoretical description of expressive
words. Secondly, I am not convinced that the theoretical apparatus Potts
develops in the second half of his paper is just what we need for dealing
with expressives.
Potts belabours the peculiarities of expressives to such an extent that one
starts wondering why they are words at all – rather than, say, grunts or fa-
cial contortions. I am inclined to adopt the opposite course, and argue that
expressives are perfectly ordinary lexemes. Granted, words like damn, fuck-
ing, and bastard are special in certain ways, but then allwords are special in
certain ways. Potts argues for a very strict separation between what he calls
‘‘expressive’’ and ‘‘descriptive’’ uses of language. The following exchange
illustrates why I wonder if Potts’s dichotomy may perhaps be too strict:
(1) A: That bastard Schmidt is playing Schubert again.
B: Schmidt is not a bastard.
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A’s use of bastard is expressive, in Potts’s sense of the word, and I take it
that in B’s statement bastard is to be construed descriptively. But then
how does B manage to contradict A? On the naive account, it is because
A’s utterance entails that Schmidt has the property of being a bastard,
which is what B denies. This also predicts that (2a) is tautologous, and
that (2b) is a contradiction, and these predictions seem correct to me:
(2) a. That bastard Schmidt is a bastard.
b. That bastard Schmidt is not a bastard.
One would expect these facts to fall out directly from the semantics of
bastard, which on Potts’s analysis they don’t. To be sure, there are ways
of capturing these observations in his framework, e.g. by constraining the
class of admissible contexts in such a way that the descriptive and expres-
sive meanings of bastard become interlocked. But an explanation along
these lines is bound to be ad hoc.
One of the characteristics of expressive idioms, according to Potts, is
that they are typically hard to deﬁne:
. . . speakers are generally unable to articulate meanings for a wide range of dis-
course particles. When pressed for deﬁnitions, they resort to illustrating where
the words would be appropriately used. Expressives in general manifest this de-
scriptive ine¤ability. (p. 11)
As this quote makes clear, however, ‘‘descriptive ine¤ability’’ is not the
prerogative of expressives. As a matter of fact, it is all over the lexicon,
as witness such disparate items as the, at, because, languid, green, pretty,
and so forth. Descriptive ine¤ability doesn’t draw the line between de-
scriptive and expressive language.
One of my English dictionaries deﬁnes one of the senses of bastard as
‘‘unpleasant or despicable person’’ (I trust that the disjunction is meant
to be read inclusively). It also deﬁnes fucking as an adjective or adverb
‘‘used for emphasis or to express anger, annoyance, contempt, or sur-
prise’’ (here, too, or appears to be inclusive). These deﬁnitions admittedly
fall short of the full signiﬁcation of their deﬁnienda, as do the vast major-
ity of lexical deﬁnitions. However, if Potts is right, they aren’t just imper-
fect but entirely beside the point – and this seems too radical to me. I
don’t believe it is wrong to say that, in at least one of its expressive senses,
fucking is an intensiﬁer that expresses anger, annoyance, etc.; and it also
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seems correct to me that in its primary expressive meaning, bastard is
used to refer to unpleasant and/or despicable persons.
Potts argues against this kind of deﬁnition that (a) in addition to its
more common deprecating uses, bastard has ‘‘a wide range of a¤ectionate
uses’’, and that (b) bastard is occasionally applied to things rather than
persons (p. 11). However, these observations merely show that, like
nearly all words, bastard is polysemous, i.e. it has several related senses.
The word bastard was initially used for persons born out of wedlock.
From this meaning, its primary expressive sense (‘‘unpleasant and/or de-
spicable person’’) was derived, which in its turn spawned further senses. If
expressive words were radically di¤erent from descriptive ones, as Potts
proposes, it would come as something of a surprise that they underlie the
same processes of meaning change. Moreover, as Potts notes himself, his
theory fails to capture the fact that words like bastard have positive as well
as negative uses (p. 20). Hence, Potts’s observations point away from his
own analysis.
A further respect in which expressives are unexceptional is that, by and
large, they appear to combine with other words in rather ordinary ways.
Not so on Potts’s account. His semantic analysis of the damn dog is
7damn8 (7the dog8) rather than 7the8 (7damn dog8), as one should have
expected. In the same vein, I would like really fucking brilliant to be ana-
lysed as 7really8 (7 fucking brilliant8), and to entail ‘‘very brilliant’’; of
course, the most straightforward way of accomplishing this is by assum-
ing that fucking is like ‘‘very’’ (or maybe ‘‘very very’’) both syntactically
and semantically. But if this is right, then fucking counter-exempliﬁes
Potts’s independence property (‘‘we can change or remove the expressive
content of a phrase without a¤ecting its descriptive content’’, p. 3), which
he claims to be an essential trait of expressives.
Another property Potts attributes to expressives is ‘‘nondisplaceability’’:
Expressives cannot (outside of direct quotation) be used to report on past events,
attitudes, or emotions, nor can they express mere possibilities, conjectures, or sup-
positions. (p. 5)
The following examples from the Google corpus suggest that, contrary to
Potts’s generalisation, fucking is ‘‘displaceable’’:
(3) a. Scary thing is that I don’t feel that fucking brilliant. I don’t feel
that fucking deep or talented.
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b. Even if you’re fucking brilliant, you can still lose the role just
because you’re not exactly the right height, look, or body type.
c. Perhaps it’s the codeine laced cough syrup I’ve been taking for a
few days now or maybe these lines are fucking brilliant!
d. I do not want us to be shit, I want us to be fucking brilliant.
I think that, in each of these cases, fucking brilliant allows for a construal
that is (a) expressive, (b) entails ‘‘very brilliant’’, and (c) is evaluated
within the scope of an operator. But if this is right, Potts’s concept of ex-
pressiveness does not correspond to a natural class.
Potts discusses an example due to Florian Schwarz in which, prima
facie, an expressive is dependent on an adverbial quantiﬁer:
(4) Whenever I pour wine, the damn bottle drips. (¼ Potts’s example
(12))
According to Potts, this is in fact evidence in favour of his nondisplace-
ability criterion, because what we infer from (4) is not that the speaker is
in a ‘‘heightened emotional state’’ on every wine-pouring occasion; rather,
‘‘we infer from the speaker’s use of damn that he is in a heightened emo-
tional state right this minute.’’ (p. 6) I’m not so sure that I share this intu-
ition. I am sure that a speaker who utters (4) truthfully will tend to be an-
noyed whenever he pours wine, and don’t see how an analysis of damn a`
la Potts could account for that intuition.
Some of Potts’s generalisations about expressives may be distorted be-
cause his pet example, that bastard Kresge, happens to be indexical. The
nondisplaceability property is a case in point. It is true that that bastard
Kresge is almost invariably interpreted relative to the utterance situation,
but this much follows already from the fact that it is indexical; there is no
reason to assume that this peculiarity is due to the fact that bastard is
expressive.
Potts makes much of the idea that descriptive and expressive words not
only have their meanings in di¤erent dimensions, but also associate with
di¤erent kinds of information: propositional vs. non-propositional. I don’t
understand this distinction. As far as I can tell, Potts’s expressive indices
are simply type t objects in disguise. For example, the intended interpre-
tation of 3a y b4, which Potts uses in his analysis of formal pronouns, is
simply that a stands in a formal (or, better perhaps, non-informal) social
relation to b, which surely may be true or false. Nor am I convinced that
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the propositional/non-propositional distinction is needed in Potts’s frame-
work. What is essential, it seems to me, is just the notion that expressive
words have a semantic dimension of their own. The idea that they carry
non-propositional information is an idle wheel in the machine.
Potts says that expressive words are ‘‘repeatable’’. If the speaker repeat-
edly uses the word damn, for example, the e¤ect is reinforcement rather
than redundancy, which is what we observe when a descriptive expression
is repeated. One of Potts’s example is (5a), which he contrasts with (5b):
(5) a. Damn, I left my damn keys in the damn car. (¼ Potts’s exam-
ple (34c))
b. ?I’m angry! I forget my keys. I’m angry! They are in the car. I’m
angry! (¼ Potts’s example (35))
Potts observes that, whereas the expressive damn is repeatable, its descrip-
tive counterpart I’m angry! is not, but he also admits that, on his own ac-
count, the comparison between (5a) and (5b) is misleading, since his claim
is that damn doesn’t have descriptive content, and it is therefore unclear
how it could have a descriptive counterpart, in the ﬁrst place. This raises
the question whether, if Potts is right, the repeatability property can be
made explicit at all. And there are more problems with it.
For starters, it should be noted that some non-expressives are emi-
nently repeatable; an obvious case in point is the entire class of deﬁnites,
including anaphoric pronouns, indexicals, and names. I am fairly sure
that, wherever that bastard Kresge can be reiterated, the name Kresge
can be used, too. This makes it even more doubtful that the notion of
repeatability can be sharpened so that it will separate expressive words
from non-expressive ones.
Potts concedes that, in some cases, repetition of a descriptive word is
permissible, and has an e¤ect of strengthening not unlike what we ob-
served in (5a); his example is big big apple. Potts dismisses this example
on the grounds that it allows for a straightforward compositional expla-
nation: a big big apple is an apple that is big for a big apple. However,
this argument does not extend to examples like far far away or many
many years ago. (Potts also mentions salad salad, which may be used for
picking out stereotypical salads, but this may be a di¤erent thing alto-
gether, e.g. because I suspect that cross-linguistically it is less common
than the other use of reduplication.)
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Finally, Potts’s theory of damn fails to explain his own observations.
First, his analysis stipulates that damn is of type 3e; e4, and therefore
doesn’t apply to the ﬁrst occurrence of damn in (5a). Secondly, since the
phrases my damn keys and the damn car denote di¤erent entities, they will
have di¤erent expressive indices associated with them, which on Potts’s
formal analysis are mutually independent: there is nothing in his theory
that would allow the expressive index for the speaker’s keys to constrain
that associated with the speaker’s car. Thirdly, it is doubtful that assign-
ing expressive indices to the speaker’s keys and car is going to be of much
help, because what we have to account for is the intuition that multiple
use of damn signals an elevated level of annoyance directed not at the
speaker’s keys or his car, but rather at the whole damn situation. An ex-
planation of this fact will require more than semantic interpretation
alone: it will have to rely on world knowledge and pragmatic inference.
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